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Unusual Bedfellows?  
PRI–PVEM Electoral Alliances in Mexican 
Legislative Elections 
Jae-Jae Spoon and Amalia Pulido Gómez 
Abstract: We examine the electoral alliances between two Mexican polit-
ical parties – the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) and the 
Partido Verde Ecologista de México (PVEM). Despite the PRI’s elec-
toral dominance, it has entered into preelection agreements with the 
PVEM since 2003. These electoral pacts are unusual for several reasons: 
the parties do not share an ideology; their bases of support come from 
different social sectors; and the PRI’s survival as a party does not depend 
on these pacts. Using electoral data from 2006 to 2015, we examine the 
electoral districts in which the PRI and the PVEM ran joint candidates in 
federal legislative elections. We find that the ultimate goals of each party, 
their past electoral performances at the legislative district level, and the 
presence of PRI–PVEM alliances in gubernatorial elections explain the 
parties’ choices to collaborate in certain districts. Our findings have im-
portant implications for understanding the behavior of parties in newer 
democracies.  
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Introduction 
Regardless of context, we know that political parties behave instrumen-
tally.1 Their behavior reflects their ultimate goal, whether that be office, 
votes, or policy (Strøm 1990). However, we observe differences in the 
behavior of parties in more established democracies in comparison to 
parties in newer democracies. Parties in established democracies, for 
example, tend to be more programmatic, while those in newer democra-
cies are typically more clientelistic in their relationships with voters 
(Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Moreover, parties in 
newer democracies may work with parties that are ideologically different 
in order to secure their dominance in the system or to survive as a party. 
The electoral alliances between the dominant Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI) and the smaller 
Partido Verde Ecologista de México (Ecological Green Party of Mexico, 
PVEM)2 are one such example.  
Unlike other green parties, the PVEM has been an office-seeking 
(Downs 1957; Riker 1962; Strøm 1990) party since its inception, allying 
itself with the party that will best enable it to get elected or reap the 
greatest benefits. In the first presidential elections following Mexico’s 
democratization in 2000, the PVEM allied with the larger Partido Acción 
Nacional (National Action Party, PAN) to ensure its survival. Since 
2003, the PVEM has formed electoral alliances with the PRI – the most 
electorally successful party in Mexico, having previously held the presi-
dency for nearly 70 consecutive years. Following their 2012 alliance, 
which saw Enrique Peña Nieto win the presidency, the PVEM and the 
PRI ran together in the 2015 legislative elections, standing joint candi-
dates in 250 of the 300 single-member districts (SMDs).3 Importantly, 
however, the electoral pacts between the PRI and the PVEM are unusual 
for several reasons: the parties do not share an ideology; their bases of 
support come from different social sectors; and the PRI’s survival as a 
party does not depend on these pacts. Why, then, would the PRI enter 
into an electoral pact with the smaller PVEM? And more specifically, on 
                                                 
1  We thank Allyson Benton, Karleen West, Jeffrey Weldon and the JPLA review-
ers for their excellent comments and suggestions. All errors remain our own. 
2  See Partido Verde Ecologista de México, online: <www.partidoverde.org.mx/> 
(27 June 2017). 
3  We use the terms “joint candidate,” “single candidate,” and “common candi-
date” interchangeably to refer to a candidate that has the support of both the 
PRI and the PVEM in a legislative district.  
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what basis do the PRI and the PVEM decide to enter into an alliance 
and run a single candidate in a specific district?4  
These two questions are the focus of this paper. The first question 
is what motivates our research; the second is what we empirically address 
here. Although researchers have examined parties’ strategic entries and 
coordination (e.g., Cox 1997), preelection alliances in parliamentary sys-
tems (e.g., Strøm, Budge, and Laver 1994; Golder 2006; Allern and 
Aylott 2009), preelection alliances that result in a single or common 
candidate in legislative elections (e.g., Tsebelis 1990; Blais and Indridason 
2007; Spoon 2011), and alliances in presidential elections (e.g., Chasquet-
ti 2001; Aléman and Tsebelis 2011; Spoon and West 2015a; Kellam 
forthcoming), to our knowledge, no extant scholarship examines the 
legislative pact between the PRI and the PVEM or what determines 
where the parties decide to run a joint candidate in an SMD.5 
We argue that the PRI and the PVEM’s decision to run joint candi-
dates in a given electoral district is influenced by each party’s ultimate 
goal. For the PRI, this is a desire to maximize its winning potential; for 
the PVEM, this is a desire to survive as an individual party in the Mexi-
can political system. Based on these goals, the PRI and the PVEM will 
run joint candidates if they have performed poorly individually in the 
prior legislative election. Conversely, if the parties have run a common 
candidate and performed well, the PRI will seek to run an alliance candi-
date again, whereas the PVEM will run alone. Finally, if the PRI–PVEM 
alliance has performed well in gubernatorial elections, the parties will 
extend this alliance to districts in legislative elections. To test our argu-
ment, we examine the PRI–PVEM alliances in the 300 SMDs in elec-
tions for the Mexican Cámara de Diputados (Chamber of Deputies) in 
2009, 2012, and 2015. Including three elections allows us to study these 
alliances both over time and across districts. Our findings have im-
portant implications for understanding party competition and party 
strategy in developing democracies. 
This paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, we discuss the 
literature on party behavior in developing democracies. We then develop 
our three hypotheses for predicting PRI–PVEM alliances. After that, we 
                                                 
4  We refer to the overall strategy of parties choosing to work together in a given 
election as an “electoral pact” or “electoral agreement.” We refer to the indi-
vidual districts in which the parties run a joint candidate as “alliance districts.” 
5  One notable exception is Montero (2015). In this paper, he examines the effect 
of the PRI–PVEM alliance in 2015 on voter behavior, campaign spending, and 
election outcomes.  
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discuss our research design and methods. In the final section, we present 
our results and consider their implications. 
Party Behavior in New Democracies 
As linkage organizations, political parties are one of the first civil society 
organizations to form when a country democratizes (Huntington 1968; 
Lawson 1980). They serve as an important intermediary institution be-
tween citizens and the government. Unlike parties in developed democ-
racies, however, parties in newer democracies either are often not ideo-
logically based or are ideologically more fluid (O’Donnell 1994). They 
are typically vote- and office-seekers, not policy-seekers (Downs 1957; 
Riker 1962; Strøm 1990). To this end, party organizations are often weak 
and party switching among legislators is common (Mainwaring and Scul-
ly 1995; Desposato 2006). Moreover, instead of being motivated by poli-
cies or programs, these parties are often driven by their desire to develop 
clientelistic relationships with the electorate for votes (Kitschelt 2000; 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Relationships between parties and voters 
are often grounded in parties’ abilities to provide electors with patronage 
in the form of selective benefits (e.g., Greene 2010). In some instances, 
parties use different strategies to appeal to different constituencies, 
which may often include providing selective benefits to supporters, in 
order to maximize their vote shares (see, e.g., Luna 2014 on the Frente 
Amplio in Uruguay and Unión Demócrata Independiente in Chile and 
Thachil 2014 on the Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] in India). 
Smaller parties in newer democracies often developed as policy ve-
hicles for issues and groups that may have been previously unaddressed 
or underrepresented (Bruhn 1997; Dominguez and Poiré 1999; Van Cott 
2005; Madrid 2005). However, even these parties did not always stay 
focused on their initial goals; instead, they became more concerned with 
improving their electoral performance and increasing their credibility in 
the political system (see, e.g., West and Spoon 2013). Research has 
demonstrated that even candidates from parties that claim to have more 
programmatic interests often select the strategy that offers the best 
chance of electoral success, even though it may not necessarily reflect the 
interests of the group they represent (see, e.g., West 2011 for an illustra-
tion of this with Pachukutik candidates in Ecuador).  
In sum, given the nature of both established and newer parties in 
developing countries, we expect to see patterns of coordination between 
parties that differ from what we would see in the party systems of devel-
oped democracies. Such patterns may include parties with different poli-
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cy positions and ideologies working together on campaigns and in the 
legislature or government.  
Using this framework of party behavior in developing countries can 
help us to understand the underlying logic of the PRI–PVEM electoral 
pacts in Mexico. After it was founded in 1929, the PRI won over 70 
percent of the vote in every presidential election until 1982 and held the 
presidency until 2000. After losing to the PAN in 2000 and 2006, it re-
gained the presidency in 2012 (see Serra 2013 for a discussion on the 
reasons that may explain the return of the PRI in 2012). The PVEM was 
founded as the Partido Verde Méxicano (Mexican Green Party) in 1986 
by a former member of the PRI, Jorge González Torres. It participated 
in the 1988 federal elections as part of the Frente Democrático Nacional 
(National Democratic Front), which brought together several left-wing 
parties to support a single candidate for president, Cuauhtémoc Cárde-
nas. In 1991 it ran independently as the Partido Verde Méxicano but 
only won 1.4 percent of the vote. Having failed to reach the threshold 
needed to remain an official party, it reorganized and renamed itself the 
Partido Verde Ecologista de México in 1993. In 2001 Jorge Emilio Gon-
zález Martínez, González’s son, assumed the party leadership.6 Since 
being reestablished in 1993, the PVEM has retained its official-party 
status with the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE) by running with other 
parties in legislative elections. Montero (2015) shows that the formation 
of coalitions may have several benefits, such as financial gains, more 
efficient campaign expenditures, and positive electoral outcomes.  
Although the two parties share a desire to gain office, the PVEM 
and the PRI have little else in common in terms of ideology, policy, or 
their support bases.7 The PRI, the former hegemonic party, started as a 
                                                 
6  See <www.partidoverde.org.mx> for more on the history of the PVEM. 
7  Based on their manifestos, the Manifestos Research Group (MRG) has given 
each party a left–right score (Volkens et al. 2015). In 2012 the PRI was much 
further to the left than the PVEM. In fact, if the PRI were to have chosen alli-
ance partners based on ideological proximity, the PRD or the PT would have 
been its natural partners. The MRG left–right score ranges from -100 (furthest 
left) to 100 (furthest right). The PRI’s, the PVEM’s, the PRD’s, and the PT’s 
2012 scores were -20.06, -6.09, -19.44, and -22.09, respectively. This further 
demonstrates how electoral alliances work differently in newer democracies. 
See Serra (2014) for an alternate perspective on the ideological positions of the 
PRI and the PVEM. By allying with a party that attracts a different subset of 
voters, the PRI improves its chances of winning. Unlike the electoral agree-
ments between the PRI and the PVEM, the agreements between the PRD, the 
PT, and the Movimiento Ciudadano (Citizens’ Movement, formerly Conver-
gencia [Convergence]) bring together parties with similar ideologies. Future re-
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mass party. According to Langston (2003: 297), the PRI had the support 
of the “workers, peasants and popular,” whereas the PVEM emerged in 
the wealthy areas of Mexico City (Cedillo 2007). These electoral agree-
ments are a function of electoral competition and help the parties to 
maintain power (Casar 2008; Reynoso 2011). They ensure the PRI’s 
dominance and the PVEM’s survival.8 However, as we argue below, the 
PVEM must run alone in some legislative districts in order to remain a 
credible party. 
A central feature of the legislative electoral agreements between the 
PRI and the PVEM is that they do not necessarily entail agreements to 
select joint candidates in all legislative districts.9 Rather, the national 
parties decide on the districts in which they will run joint candidates or 
field their own candidates. Since the legislative alliances between the two 
parties began in 2003, they have only once, in 2006, run common candi-
dates in all legislative districts. In the legislative districts in which the PRI 
and the PVEM have run joint candidates, the vast majority have been 
from the PRI.10 However, the percentage of PVEM candidates in these 
alliance districts has increased over time, from 9.5 percent in 2009 to 
23.2 percent in 2015 (see Table 1). On what basis do the PRI and the 
PVEM choose a joint candidate for a specific district? It is to this ques-
tion that we now turn.  
Explaining PRI–PVEM Alliance Districts 
As a means to get elected in plurality legislative elections, two or more 
parties will often run a single candidate (Strøm, Budge, and Laver 1994; 
Golder 2006). The logic behind these preelection agreements is that 
electing a candidate from one of these parties is preferred to a win by the 
opposition party. In France, for example, the Parti Socialiste (Socialist 
Party) has run joint candidates with Les Verts (the Greens) in legislative 
                                                                                                    
search should examine the districts in which these parties ran joint candidates 
versus those in which each party ran its own candidate.  
8  The PVEM benefits when it is part of a district-level alliance that wins. Not 
only does it receive money from the federal government, but the votes the alli-
ance receives contribute to its overall vote share in the multimember propor-
tional representation constituencies. 
9  The electoral laws concerning electoral agreements between parties have 
evolved since the mid-1980s. Beginning in 1996, parties could run in partial co-
alitions in the legislative elections (IFE 2008).  
10  It is important to note that we are interested in the districts where the parties 
run joint candidates and not in the candidates’ party affiliation. This is a topic 
for future research.  
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elections from the first round since 1997. For both parties, electing a 
left-wing candidate is preferred to a win by the right or extreme right 
(Blais and Indridason 2007; Spoon 2011). In the Mexican case, the PRI 
and the PVEM are concerned not only with minimizing the electoral 
success of the PAN but also with gaining office (and not necessarily 
advancing a set of policies). For example, Méndez de Hoyos (2012) finds 
that Mexican parties are more likely to form coalitions prior to guberna-
torial elections if they face high levels of electoral competition. Thus, 
unlike the ideological similarities that underlie the electoral agreements 
between the Parti Socialiste and Les Verts in France, the PRI and the 
PVEM have come together for purely instrumental reasons: to win votes 
and ultimately seats.  
It is not hard to understand why the PVEM – like other small par-
ties (e.g., Izquierda Unida in Spain, the Progressive Democrats in Ire-
land, and the Partido Liberal in Brazil (Golder 2006; Spoon and West 
2015a)) – would run a joint candidate with a larger party (the PRI) in a 
given legislative district. Similar to other smaller parties that have run 
candidates with larger parties, all of the seats won in the Cámara de Di-
putados by the PVEM since 2003 have been in alliance districts. The 
PVEM has not won a single seat in the lower house independent of the 
PRI. More importantly, it is only through the alliances with the PRI that 
the PVEM has been able to maintain its status as an official party.11 
However, in addition to securing seats and, in turn, retaining its official 
party status, the PVEM needs to maintain its standing as an independent 
party in the eyes of the voters. Therefore, if the PVEM has performed 
better alone in the previous elections, it will continue to run candidates 
by itself.12 Conversely, if the PVEM has run alone and done poorly in 
                                                 
11  Since the 2007 electoral reform, each candidate on the ballot in an alliance 
district appears three times: as the PRI, the PVEM, and the alliance candidate. 
We can speculate that the PRI backed this reform to demonstrate its support 
for transparency. Voters thus have the option to vote for the same candidate 
three different ways (IFE 2008). As we discuss below, since we are focused on 
the districts in which the parties choose to run joint candidates (rather than the 
voters’ specific choices or which party the candidate is from), the nature of the 
ballot does not influence our analysis.  
12  We recognize that we are not explaining the negotiation process between the 
leaders of the PRI and the PVEM. Scholars have identified candidate selection 
as a black box, in that it is difficult to know how the decisions are made within 
the organizations of these parties (e.g., Gallagher and Marsh 1988). To fully 
understand the process, we would need further evidence, such as interviews 
with party leaders. Moreover, it is beyond the scope of this paper to understand 
the negotiations between party leaders. 
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the previous legislative election, it is more likely to run with the PRI in 
the subsequent election in order to access the PRI’s resources and ex-
panded voter base. If, the PVEM has run in an alliance in a given district 
and performed well, it is more likely to run with the PRI again – which 
will further the party’s goal of survival. These scenarios highlight the 
PVEM’s desire to survive and increase its legitimacy as a political actor in 
Mexican politics. Thus, our first two hypotheses are as follows: 
H1a: If the vote share of the PVEM in a nonalliance district increased in 
the previous legislative election, the probability that the PRI and the 
PVEM will enter into an alliance in the district decreases.  
H1b: If the vote share of the PVEM in an alliance district increased in 
the previous legislative election, the probability that the PRI and the 
PVEM will enter into an alliance in the district increases. 
However, why does the PRI run common candidates with the PVEM? 
One could argue that this decision may have been quite costly for the 
PRI, since the PVEM has been involved in several acts of corruption 
(Serra 2016). However, we argue that the PRI, as an office-seeking party, 
is focused on its dominance in the Cámara de Diputados. We thus con-
tend that if the PRI has performed poorly by itself in the previous legis-
lative election in a given district, it will be more likely to join forces with 
the PVEM in the subsequent election. By allying with the PVEM, the 
PRI increases its chances of winning that seat. Given their ultimate focus 
on winning seats, the PRI and the PVEM will be more likely to run to-
gether again in a given legislative district if they perform well in an alli-
ance in the previous election. Nevertheless, both parties have different 
goals: the PRI wants to maximize its seat share and, ultimately, its domi-
nance, whereas the PVEM wants to ensure its survival. Thus, our next 
two hypotheses are as follows:  
H2a: If the vote share of the PRI in a nonalliance district increased in the 
previous legislative election, the probability that the PRI and the PVEM 
will enter into an alliance in the district decreases.  
H2b: If the vote share of the PRI in an alliance district increased in the 
previous legislative election, the probability that the PRI and the PVEM 
will enter into an alliance in the district increases. 
Finally, research has demonstrated that parties use subnational politics to 
improve their electoral fortunes (see, e.g., Garman, Haggard, and Willis 
2001; Boone 2003; Escobar-Lemmon 2003; O’Neill 2003; Vlahos 2013; 
Meguid n.y.). Moreover, party behavior at the subnational level can influ-
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ence behavior at the national level (see, e.g., Hicken and Stoll 2008; 
Spoon and West 2015b). In federal states, such as Mexico, party perfor-
mance at the gubernatorial level may influence electoral decisions at the 
federal level (Carlson et al. 2009). Furthermore, parties often use subna-
tional elections as a testing ground for national elections. More specifi-
cally, subnational elections can give parties the experience and resources 
required to run nationally (Jones 1997; Moreno 2003; Van Cott 2005). 
For example, Spoon and West (2015b) find that parties’ electoral per-
formances and presence in subnational elections influence their likeli-
hood of entering the presidential race. If a strategy works at the subna-
tional level, parties may decide to use it in legislative or presidential elec-
tions. Similarly, they may choose to use a successful national-level strate-
gy at the subnational level. Likewise, voters can use subnational elections 
to send signals to parties about their policy preferences (Alesina and 
Rosenthal 1989; Kedar 2009). Kedar (2009) demonstrates that in Ger-
many, for instance, parties that are in the national government almost al-
ways lose state-election votes from citizens who wish to change policy. 
Following this logic, Mexican parties have engaged in multilevel strate-
gies, running joint candidates in both legislative and gubernatorial elec-
tions. In the gubernatorial elections that preceded the 2015 legislative 
elections, for example, the PRI and the PVEM ran a single candidate in 
28 of the 31 states plus the Federal District. Only in Campeche, Colima, 
Durango, and Querétaro did the parties not run together. Our fifth hy-
pothesis adheres to this logic of multilevel party behavior and is as fol-
lows:  
H3: If the vote share of the PRI–PVEM alliance increased in the previ-
ous gubernatorial election, the probability that the PRI and the PVEM 
will enter into an alliance in a given district increases.  
Data and Methods  
To test our hypotheses on why the PRI and the PVEM choose to run 
together in some districts but not in others, we use electoral data for the 
300 SMDs in the Mexican Cámara de Diputados for the legislative elec-
tions in 2009, 2012, and 2015.13 This gives us panel data with 900 obser-
                                                 
13  Mexico’s Cámara de Diputados has 500 members, of which 300 are elected in 
SMDs and 200 are elected through closed-list proportional representation. Un-
like in other mixed-member systems, Mexican voters have one vote. The 200 
proportional representation members are chosen based on the number of votes 
that each party wins in the SMDs.  
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vations. The unit of analysis is the district-year. We do not include the 
2006 elections as there was a PRI–PVEM alliance in all electoral districts; 
therefore, there was no variation across districts.  
The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable indicating wheth-
er or not there is an electoral alliance between the PRI and the PVEM in 
a given district in a given election. This variable is coded 1 if there is an 
alliance and 0 if not. The number of districts in which these two parties 
ran together varies; however, the number has increased in every election. 
In 2009 they ran together in 21 percent of the districts; in 2012, in 66 
percent of the districts; and in 2015, in 83.3 percent of the districts (see 
table 1 for an overview of the alliances). The alliance agreements be-
tween the PRI and the PVEM can be found on the website of the Insti-
tuto Nacional Electoral (INE).  
Table 1. PRI–PVEM Alliances by Year 
Year Alliance Districts PRI Candidate PVEM Candidate 
2003 97 92 (94.8) 5 (5.2) 
2006 300 276 (92.0) 24 (8.0) 
2009 63 57 (90.5) 6 (9.5) 
2012 198 157 (79.3) 41 (20.7) 
2015 250 192 (76.8) 58 (23.2) 
Source:  INE.  
Note:  The numbers in parentheses are the percentages of PRI and the PVEM candi-
dates, respectively, based on the number of alliance districts.  
Our key independent variables relate to each party’s performance in the 
previous legislative and gubernatorial elections. First, we look at the 
electoral performance of both parties in legislative elections. We include 
two different variables for the vote shares of the PRI and the PVEM. 
The first variables, vote share PRI (t-1) and vote share PVEM (t-1), refer to 
the votes that these parties received in all districts (both alliance and 
nonalliance districts) in the previous election. The second set of variables 
are interaction terms between whether or not there was an alliance in the 
previous legislative election and the vote shares that the PRI and the 
PVEM won in the previous election. These electoral data are from the 
IFE.  
Because of the nature of the Mexican ballot, we include two differ-
ent specifications for the parties’ lagged vote shares in 2009, 2012, and 
2015. In 2009 and 2012 voters had the opportunity to cast their vote for 
the same candidate three different ways (see footnote 11). We can use 
the case of Benjamin Castillo Valdez, a joint PRI–PVEM candidate in 
the First Federal Electoral District of Baja California in 2012, to illustrate 
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this. Valdez was on the ballot as a PRI candidate, as a PVEM candidate, 
and as a coalition candidate. He won 29.89 percent of the vote under the 
PRI label, 3.47 percent under the PVEM label, and 7.5 percent under the 
PRI–PVEM alliance label. Together, Valdez, the PRI–PVEM alliance 
candidate won 40.86 percent of the vote. In 2015 we thus have two dif-
ferent values for the PRI and the PVEM lagged vote shares: the values 
that each party won on its own (PRI with 29.89 percent and the PVEM 
with 3.47 percent) and the combined coalition vote share for both the 
PRI and the PVEM (40.86 percent). Conversely, in 2006 people who 
voted for the PRI–PVEM coalition could only vote for the alliance can-
didate. To determine the vote percentage each party received, we used 
the parties’ agreed-upon distribution of the coalition’s total vote share. 
We use this agreement as a proxy to determine the individual vote for 
each party in a given district.14 Importantly, although the agreement was 
based on the coalition’s total national vote share, we use it to determine 
each party’s vote share in a given district to avoid losing observations 
(see appendix for discussion on how we calculated each party’s vote 
share). Because we are interested in the districts in which the parties have 
chosen to run joint candidates and not whether the candidate is from the 
PRI or the PVEM, the fact that voters were presented with three differ-
ent ways to support a single candidate on the 2009 and 2012 ballots does 
not influence our analysis.  
Second, to test our hypothesis on the multilevel nature of party be-
havior, we use strength of the PRI–PVEM alliance at the gubernatorial level. 
This variable captures how strong the PRI–PVEM alliance was in the 
previous gubernatorial elections in each federal legislative district. To 
calculate this variable, we collected the gubernatorial results at the mu-
nicipal level and created a variable that reflects the percentage of munici-
palities that the PRI–PVEM alliance won in each legislative district. For 
                                                 
14  We recognize that there are some potential issues with the 2006 vote-share 
specification. However, the changes to the ballot structure in the 2007 electoral 
reform does not allow us to have the same estimate that we have for the indi-
vidual vote shares of the parties in 2012 and 2015. In order to keep 2009 in our 
sample, we use this proxy. To ensure that the 2009 observations do not deter-
mine our results, however, we include a dummy variable to control for the pos-
sible 2009 effect. As table A.3 shows, the results are similar except for the vari-
able that captures the previous vote share of the PVEM in alliance districts. 
The direction is positive, but the results are not significant. This could be due 
to the poor electoral performance of the coalition in the 2006 elections. The 
PRI–PVEM coalition finished in third place in both the presidential and the 
legislative elections, with 22.26 percent and 28.21 percent of the vote share, re-
spectively.  
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example, the PRI–PVEM alliance won in 8 out of 10 municipalities in 
the First Federal Electoral District of Aguascalientes in the gubernatorial 
elections preceding the 2012 election. Thus, the strength of the PRI–
PVEM alliance in this federal district is 0.8. These data are from the IFE.  
We also include several control variables. First, we employ two vari-
ables for the strength of the other two major parties in gubernatorial elections: 
the PAN and the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (Party of the 
Democratic Revolution, PRD). We expect the strength of the PAN to 
affect the alliance decision. The PVEM was a coalition partner with the 
PAN in 2000 and, as Shirk (2005: 161) points out, “provided Fox with a 
coalition partner and enabled him to bill his candidacy as a pact for an 
alliance of change.” The coalition between the PRI and the PVEM may 
be used as a way to promote the same idea of change. Therefore, we 
expect that the better the PAN did at the state level, the more likely the 
PRI and the PVEM are to run together in the federal legislative elections 
to maximize their winning potential. We also include a variable measur-
ing the electoral strength of the PRD. We similarly expect that the 
stronger the PRD is, the more likely the PRI and the PVEM are to form 
an alliance. These variables were collected and coded using electoral 
information from the IFE.  
Second, we control for socioeconomic features of the population by 
including a marginalization index created by the Consejo Nacional de 
Poblacíon (CONAPO). This index measures four different dimensions: 
levels of education, living conditions (whether or not people have access 
to public services such as water and electricity), population size, and 
population income. The unit of analysis of this index is the municipality. 
We thus collected the index for each municipality and then we aggregat-
ed it to the federal legislative district and calculated the average. We ex-
pect marginalization to have some effect on the parties’ decision to run 
joint candidates. In districts with high levels of marginalization, we ex-
pect parties to be less likely to enter into an alliance because they may 
have better electoral strategies, such as patron–client relations or clien-
telism. As the literature on developing countries shows (e.g., Magaloni et 
al. 2006; Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2012), poverty creates 
favorable conditions for politicians to practice clientelism. Therefore, we 
expect that in districts with high levels of marginalization, the electoral 
success of parties may not rely on the electoral alliance but on other 
factors, such as patron–client relations.  
Third, we control for voter turnout. We use concurrent voter turnout 
and not lagged turnout because the legislative elections are held every 
three years, some simultaneously alongside presidential elections. There-
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fore, if we use the number of votes from the previous election, the na-
ture of the election could be quite different. Although having a presiden-
tial election the same day as the legislative election increases turnout (De 
Remes 2006), we use concurrent turnout for all elections for consistency. 
These data are also from the IFE. We expect that as voter turnout in-
creases in a given district, so will the probability that the PRI and the 
PVEM will run a joint candidate. If turnout is low, the proportion of 
voters who represent the voto duro15 of the traditional parties, like the 
PRI, will be high (Crespo 2010). However, increased turnout is likely to 
involve newer and more independent voters, thus creating more electoral 
uncertainty for the parties. By running in an alliance with the PVEM, the 
PRI is able to mobilize more voters, thereby ensuring electoral success 
for both parties.  
Finally, we include the lagged dependent variable as the previous alliance 
may be a strong predictor of future alliances, especially if parties are 
interested in building electoral relationships with other parties (see table 
A.1 in the appendix for the descriptive statistics of all variables included 
in the analysis).  
As our dependent variable is dichotomous, we use a logistic model 
to determine the probability of the electoral alliances between the PRI 
and the PVEM. We use robust standard errors to account for potential 
heteroscedasticity.  
Results  
Table 2 presents the results from our logistic regression analysis. Model 1 
uses the vote shares the PRI and the PVEM won individually in alliance 
districts. Model 2 uses the total vote share of the PRI–PVEM coalition 
in alliance districts. As our results are substantively similar for both mod-
els, we only discuss the results for Model 1 below.16 Our results support 
all of our hypotheses except H1b.  
  
                                                 
15  Crespo (2010) defines the voto duro as an ideological vote. Voters who represent 
the voto duro have strong familial, emotional, or patronage ties with the party 
and tend to go to the polls consistently and frequently.  
16  As we are focused on the districts selected and not the candidate’s party in this 
analysis, it is not problematic that we do not identify the candidate’s party. 
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Table 2. Predicting PRI–PVEM Alliances 
DV: PRI–PVEM Alliance Model 1 Model 2 
Vote share PRI (t-1) -6.737*** 
(1.451) 
-10.050*** 
(0.744) 
Vote share PRI in alliance district (t-1) 13.814*** 
(1.816) 
 
Vote share PVEM (t-1)  -5.567* 
(3.108) 
-16.754*** 
(3.692) 
Vote share PVEM in alliance district (t-1) -17.177* 
(8.899) 
 
Vote share PRI–PVEM (t-1)  17.199*** 
(1.684) 
PRI–PVEM in gubernatorial elections 1.651*** 
(0.273) 
1.711*** 
(0.268) 
PAN in gubernatorial elections 1.421*** 
(0.294) 
1.561*** 
(0.297) 
PRD in gubernatorial elections 0.998*** 
(0.352) 
1.105*** 
(0.363) 
Marginalization -3.265*** 
(0.704) 
-4.057*** 
(0.674) 
Turnout 4.041*** 
(0.811) 
4.723*** 
(0.828) 
PRI_PVEM alliance lag  -3.189*** 
(0.872) 
-6.861*** 
(0.744) 
Constant  0.481 
(0.767) 
2.105** 
(0.824) 
N 900 900 

 0.219 0.248 
Log pseudolikelihood -480.584 -462.974 
Note:  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.10. Results are from logistic regressions with 
clustered robust standard errors. Each model uses a different specification of 
the lagged vote share of the PRI and the PVEM. See text for discussion. 
First, our results show that the PVEM is more likely to enter into an 
alliance in a given district if it did poorly in the previous election in both 
nonalliance (H1a) and alliance districts (H1b). Although the results in 
alliance districts run counter to our expectations, both sets of results 
demonstrate that the PVEM is balancing its desire for office with that of 
survival. Second, we find that previous electoral performance influences 
the PRI’s decision to join an alliance in both nonalliance (H2a) and alli-
ance (H2b) districts. As the PRI’s vote share in nonalliance districts in-
creases, the probability that it will enter into an alliance with the PVEM 
decreases (H2a). Conversely, if the PRI’s vote share increased in alliance 
districts in the previous election, the probability of an alliance will also 
increase (H2b). These results highlight the office-seeking nature of the 
PRI: it will identify the best strategy in a given electoral context to max-
  Alliances in Mexican Legislative Elections 77
 

 
imize its winning potential. Finally, we find that if there is strong support 
for the PRI–PVEM alliance at the state level, the PRI and the PVEM are 
more likely to enter into an alliance in the legislative elections (H3). This 
finding clearly demonstrates the multilevel nature of the parties’ strate-
gies.  
To show the substantive effect of our results, we simulate and plot 
predicted probabilities. Figures 1–3 illustrate these effects. The depend-
ent variable for all of the figures is the probability of an alliance. The 
dashed lines represent the 95 percent confidence intervals and the tick 
marks along the X-axis denote the distribution of the independent varia-
ble.  
Figure 1 illustrates the influence of the PVEM’s previous electoral 
performance on the probability of entering into an alliance. Figure 1a 
shows that there is a significant relationship between the PVEM vote 
share in nonalliance districts and the probability of an alliance when the 
PVEM’s previous vote share was between 10 percent and 20 percent; 
however, the substantive effect is rather small. Figure 1b similarly 
demonstrates that as the PVEM’s vote share increases in alliance dis-
tricts, so does the probability of an alliance – although the confidence 
intervals are quite large. To increase its legitimacy as a party, maintain its 
status as an official party, and increase its chance of winning, entering 
into an alliance in districts where it performed poorly in the previous 
legislative election is the logical choice for the PVEM. 
Figure 1. Probability of PRI–PVEM Alliance for the PVEM 
a) Nonalliance Districts 
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b) Alliance Districts  
 
Note:  These figures are based on model 1. The dashed lines represent the 95 per-
cent confidence intervals. The tick marks on the x-axis denote the distribution 
of the independent variable. 
 
Figure 2a demonstrates that as the PRI’s previous vote share decreases in 
a nonalliance district, so does its probability of running in an alliance. 
Holding all other variables at their means, the probability of the PRI 
joining forces with the PVEM is 88.6 percent if the PRI’s previous vote 
share is 10 percent; this probability drops to 60 percent if the PRI’s pre-
vious vote share is 50 percent. The PRI’s decision to join an alliance is 
arguably based on two phenomena in Mexican party politics: party iden-
tification and social segmentation. According to Moreno and Méndez 
(2007), the percentage of the electorate that voted according to party 
identification dropped from 65 percent in 2000 to 59 percent in 2006. 
One of the reasons for this decrease was generational change in Mexican 
society. Moreover, it shows that voters’ identification with the PRI was 
the most affected by this change.  
Moreno (2009) further argues that the 3.3 million undecided voters 
in the 2006 elections reflected a lack of party identification among the 
Mexican electorate. According to Moreno’s predictions, citizens who do 
not identify with a party would again play a key role in the 2012 elec-
tions. It is quite reasonable then that the alliance with the PVEM is a 
strategy to recover some of the electorate that no longer strongly identi-
fies with the PRI. Second, the PVEM represents a different social seg-
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ment from the PRI. According to Parametría (2015), those who vote for 
the PVEM are between 18 and 25 years old. Women are also more likely 
to vote for the PVEM. Conversely, men over 56 years old are more likely 
to vote for the PRI. The PVEM thus represents a new generation of 
young people with postmaterialist values (Inglehart 1997). Due to the 
volatility of the Mexican electorate since 2000, it is thus quite rational for 
the PRI to want to form alliances with the PVEM in the districts where 
it has performed poorly.  
Figure 2b shows a strong relationship between the PRI’s previous 
vote share in alliance districts and the probability of joining an alliance. 
Holding all other variables at their means, when the PRI’s previous vote 
share is similarly held at its mean of 15.8 percent, its likelihood of enter-
ing into an alliance with the PVEM is 52 percent. Increasing the PRI’s 
vote share to the maximum value of 56.2 percent increases the probabil-
ity of an alliance to over 95 percent. This demonstrates the PRI’s office-
seeking nature and its willingness to reuse a strategy that has worked well 
in the past. 
 
Figure 2. Probability of PRI–PVEM Alliance for the PRI 
a) Nonalliance Districts 
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b) Alliance Districts 
 
Note:  These two figures are based on model 1. The dashed lines represent the 95 
percent confidence intervals. The tick marks on the x-axis denote the distribu-
tion of the independent variable. 
Finally, figure 3 demonstrates that as the PRI–PVEM alliance’s guberna-
torial electoral success increases, so does the probability that the parties 
will form an alliance in the federal legislative elections.  
Figure 3. Influence of PRI–PVEM Gubernatorial Success on PRI–PVEM 
Alliances 
 
Note:  This figure is based on model 1. The dashed lines represent the 95 percent 
confidence intervals. The tick marks on the x-axis denote the distribution of the 
independent variable. 
.4
.6
.8
1
Pr
(A
lli
an
ce
)
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6
Vote Share PRI (t-1) in Alliance Districts
.2
.4
.6
.8
P
r(A
lli
an
ce
)
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
PRI-PVEM Gubernatorial Electoral Success
  Alliances in Mexican Legislative Elections 81
 

 
If the alliance did not win any municipalities in a given district, the prob-
ability of a federal legislative alliance is 42.4 percent. However, if the 
alliance won all of the municipalities in the legislative district, the proba-
bility of an alliance increases to 79.3 percent. Thus, figure 3 clearly shows 
that the parties engage in a multilevel electoral strategy. Several scholars 
(e.g., Langston 2003; De Remes 2006; Hicken and Stoll 2008; Spoon and 
West 2015b) argue that parties’ performances and behavior at the state 
level influence their choice of electoral strategy at the federal level.  
Several of our control variables are also significant. First, if the 
PAN is strong at the state level, the probability of the PRI and the 
PVEM running together in the legislative elections increases. This shows 
that if there is a threat from the other major party at the gubernatorial 
level, the PRI and the PVEM are more likely to join together to maxim-
ize their vote share in the legislative election. Like the PVEM, the PAN 
has historically been more conservative than the PRI. The PAN emerged 
in 1939 as a reaction to cardenismo, which was considered a socialist ideol-
ogy (Loaeza 1974). The PVEM similarly appeals to a more conservative 
electorate. Support for the death penalty and life imprisonment are two 
examples of the parties’ policies.17 Thus, by allying with the PVEM, the 
PRI may be able to appeal to voters that it would not be able to if it ran 
alone. Second, we also find that when the PRD was strong at the state 
level, alliances were more likely. Along with the PAN, the PRD has been 
the main opposition to the PRI since 2000. In 2006 the PRI dropped to 
third place in both the legislative and presidential elections, while the 
PAN and the PRD finished first and second, respectively. Because the 
left-wing PRD was founded by former PRI members, forming an elec-
toral coalition allowed the PRI to maximize its probability of winning. 
Third, the marginalization index is negative and significant. As we ex-
pected, in districts with high levels of marginalization, the PRI and the 
PVEM are less likely to run together. This could be related to the strate-
gies used by parties to win elections in newer democracies. In regions 
with high levels of marginalization, clientelism could be the best strategy 
to win votes (e.g., Magaloni et al. 2006). In more marginalized districts 
the existence of an electoral alliance may be irrelevant for voters. Parties 
can individually appeal to voters with material goods and future promis-
es. The effect of the alliance could thus have only a marginal effect on a 
voter’s decision. Finally, turnout is positive and significant as we predict-
ed. The higher the level of turnout, the more likely the PRI and the 
PVEM are to run together. One of the reasons for this finding is that 
                                                 
17  See Tuckman 2015 and <www.partidoverde.org.mx> (27 June 2017). 
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increased turnout is a result of an expanded electorate. These newer 
voters are young people who may be more attracted to the PVEM than a 
mass-based party like the PRI. Therefore, when the parties run together, 
turnout increases.  
Conclusion  
In this paper, we have sought to further understand the nature of parties 
in newer democracies by conducting the first systematic analysis of the 
electoral alliances in legislative elections between the PRI and the 
PVEM. We find that the PRI and the PVEM are more likely to run 
common candidates in a given legislative district if they each performed 
poorly in previous legislative elections. However, given the PRI’s ulti-
mate goal of winning office and the PVEM’s objective of balancing sur-
vival with winning office, the probability of running together in alliance 
districts differs. For the PRI, if an alliance candidate has done well, it will 
use the same strategy again. For the PVEM, however, if an alliance can-
didate has performed well, it will be less likely to repeat this strategy. In 
addition, an alliance is more likely if the PRI–PVEM gubernatorial alli-
ances were electorally successful. These findings reveal the strategic be-
havior both political parties use to maximize their own electoral success 
and minimize the success of the opposition.  
Importantly, these alliances benefit both parties. By running joint 
candidates with the PRI, the PVEM has been able to increase its legiti-
macy and maintain its official status as a political party.18 Its pact with 
the PRI has also seen the PVEM profit more from public funding than it 
would have done fielding its own candidates (see table A.3).19 For the 
PRI, these alliances have helped it to win and maintain office in the new 
political and electoral reality ushered in by democratization – one where 
the PRI now has to form electoral coalitions to maintain its dominance. 
Moreover, the coalitions have the advantage of reducing campaign 
spending as both parties share the costs. 
                                                 
18  The threshold to maintain a party’s official status was increased from 2 percent 
to 3 percent in 2014 (see Diario Oficial de la Federación, article 116, incise f (Con-
greso de la Unión 2014)). 
19  Public funding in Mexico is distributed following a 30/70 formula: 30 percent 
of the available funding is equally distributed among the official political par-
ties, while the other 70 percent is distributed according to vote shares in the 
previous federal elections. Parties can also take private donations, but they can-
not be higher than 10 percent of the total public money that the parties receive 
(IFE 2009).  
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Our results have important implications for understanding party 
behavior in newer democracies. First, following other research on elec-
toral alliances in Latin America (see, e.g., Spoon and West 2015a; Kellam 
forthcoming), we show that in newer democracies electoral pacts have a 
different logic than in consolidated democracies. In the case of the PRI–
PVEM pact, both parties behave as office-seeking organizations, and 
their main goal is to win elections (Downs 1957; Riker 1962). They do 
not appear to be interested in building long-term relationships based on 
policy interests. The primary variable that affects their decision to run 
common candidates in a given district is past electoral performance. 
Thus, we may see future electoral agreements between parties based 
solely on a desire to increase their vote share.  
Second, our findings have implications for understanding the role 
that small parties play in newer democracies. In consolidated democra-
cies small parties often challenge the dominance of the major parties and 
their way of participating in the political system. They are typically poli-
cy-seeking and ideologically focused parties (see, e.g., Cox 1997). When 
they do work with other parties, they collaborate with those they are 
ideologically proximate to (see, e.g., Blais and Indridason 2007; Spoon 
2011). However, in newer democracies – especially those in Latin Amer-
ica – smaller parties can be quite different. While some have argued that 
these parties can bring about democratic reforms by raising issues that 
the major parties do not (see, e.g., Bruhn 1997; Dominguez and Poiré 
1999; Madrid 2005; West and Spoon 2013), they may not represent a 
specific constituency at all but rather may have emerged as a family busi-
ness (as the PVEM did). They may even simply be alternative organiza-
tions that the big parties use to maintain their power. If this is the case, it 
calls into question the nature and quality of representation that newer 
democracies are creating. 
Although this paper is an important first step toward understanding 
the electoral agreements in Mexico and what they tell us about party 
behavior in newer democracies, more research is needed. First, to better 
understand the alliance between the PRI and the PVEM, it is necessary 
to examine the electoral pacts between other parties, such as the one 
between the PRD, the PT and Convergencia. Do the same factors ex-
plain how the PRD and the PT decide on which districts to run joint 
candidates? Second, further research is needed on the nature of the PRI–
PVEM alliances and on which candidates run under which label. Look-
ing at candidates’ profiles, specifically their backgrounds, could provide a 
more complete explanation about the incentives to form an alliance in a 
given district. For example, it is well known that several PVEM candi-
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dates are former PRI members; however, there has been no systematic 
investigation into whether the PRI is using the PVEM to nominate can-
didates who are loyal to the PRI.20  
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Appendix 
Table A.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
PRI–PVEM alliance 900 0.568 0.496 0.000 1.000
PRI–PVEM alliance lag 900 0.623 0.485 0.000 1.000
Vote share PRI (t-1) [Alone + 
Coalition] 
900 0.293 0.112 0.022 0.735
Vote share PRI (t-1) [Coalition] 900 0.158 0.144 0.000 0.562
Vote share PVEM (t-1) [Alone 
+ Coalition] 
900 0.061 0.036 0.010 0.404
Vote share PVEM (t-1) Coali-
tion] 
900 0.037 0.037 0.000 0.259
Vote share PRI–PVEM (t-1) 
[Total] Coalition] 
900 0.210 0.183 0.000 0.623
PRI–PVEM in Gubernatorial 
Elections 
900 0.415 0.435 0.000 1.000
PAN in Gubernatorial Elec-
tions 
900 0.261 0.364 0.000 1.000
PRD in Gubernatorial Elec-
tions 
900 0.185 0.346 0.000 1.000
Marginalization 900 0.213 0.122 0.032 0.642
Turnout 900 0.517 0.115 0.231 0.832
Table A.2. Vote Share Distribution for 2006 Based on Electoral Agreement 
between the PRI and the PVEM 
Vote share of the 
coalition 
Percentage of votes for 
the PVEM 
Total percentage of votes 
for the PVEM 
0–30.9 6.6 6.6 
31–31.9 0.5 7.1 
32–32.9 0.5 7.6 
33–38.9 0.5 8.1 
39–39.9 0.3 8.4 
40–40.9 0.3 8.7 
41–41.9 0.3 9.0 
42–42.9 0.3 9.3 
Source:  INE 2006. 
Note:  The PRI is allocated the difference between the total vote share in the district 
and what the PVEM is allocated. For every percent the coalition receives in the 
district above 42.9 percent, the PVEM is allocated an additional 0.3 percent, 
and the PRI is allocated the rest. 
Based on the agreement, if the total vote share for the coalition is equal 
to 30.9 percent or less, the PVEM will receive 6.6 percent of the vote 
share, and the remaining vote share will be allocated to the PRI (up to 
24.3 percent). For each extra point up to 33 percent, the PVEM will 
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receive an extra 0.5 percent, and the remaining vote share will go to the 
PRI. For example, if the coalition’s vote share is 32 percent, 7.6 percent 
will go to the PVEM, and 24.4 percent will go to the PRI. If the coalition 
receives between 33.01 percent and 38.9 percent of the vote share, the 
PVEM receives 8.1 percent, and the remainder goes to the PRI. If the 
coalition wins more than 38.9 percent, for each extra point, the PVEM 
will get 0.3 percent extra, and the rest will go to the PRI (INE 2006). For 
example, in district 2 in the state of Nuevo León, the coalition won 45.14 
percent. Based on this agreement, we allocated 34.94 percent to the PRI 
and 10.2 percent to the PVEM.  
Table A.3. Predicting PRI–PVEM Alliances with 2009 Dummy 
DV: PRI–PVEM Alliance Model 3 Model 4 
Vote share PRI (t-1) -7.471*** 
(1.472) 
-7.844*** 
(1.472) 
Vote share PRI in alliance district (t-1) 7.901*** 
(1.942) 
 
Vote share PVEM (t-1)  -5.093* 
(2.851) 
-6.421* 
(2.774) 
Vote share PVEM in alliance district (t-1) 2.434 
(5.636) 
 
Vote Share PRI–PVEM (t-1)  8.340*** 
(1.861) 
PRI–PVEM in Gubernatorial Elections 1.401*** 
(0.279) 
1.411*** 
(0.279) 
PAN in Gubernatorial Elections 1.093*** 
(0.310) 
1.110*** 
(0.311) 
PRD in Gubernatorial Elections -0.022 
(0.444) 
0.020 
(0.444) 
Marginalization -1.448** 
(0.738) 
-1.618* 
(0.741) 
Turnout 3.291*** 
(0.899) 
3.519*** 
(0.883) 
PRI_PVEM alliance lag  -1.272* 
(0.769) 
-2.132* 
(0.843) 
2009 -2.985*** 
(0.307) 
-2.670*** 
(0.315) 
Constant  1.095 
(0.789) 
1.206 
(0.777) 
N 900 900 

 0.307 0.310 
Log pseudolikelihood -426.321 -424.444 
Note:  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.10. Results are from logistic regressions with 
clustered robust standard errors. Each model uses a different specification of 
the lagged vote share of the PRI and the PVEM. See text for discussion. 
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Table A.4. PVEM Public Funding 
Year  Amount (in USD)* Amount (in Mexican MXN) 
2000 26,110,485.70 247,243,235.31 
2003 33,888,031.72 366,979,143.52 
2006  34,995,897.89 382,235,987.18 
2009 22,344,154.07 304,087,737.33 
2012 39,909,310.81 478,911,729.74 
2015  27,075,312.17 429,012,013.43 
Source:  INE 2015. 
Note:  * The value in USD is calculated based on the exchange rate for each year. 
 
 
 
 
¿Parejas Inusuales? Las Alianzas Electorales del PRI y el PVEM 
en las Elecciones Legislativas en México 
Resumen: En este trabajo analizamos las alianzas electorales entre el 
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) y el Partido Verde Ecologista 
de México (PVEM). A pesar de su dominio electoral, el PRI ha celebra-
do alianzas electorales con el PVEM desde el 2003. Estos acuerdos elec-
torales son inusuales por varias razones: los partidos no comparten una 
ideología; sus bases electorales son de diferentes sectores sociales; y la 
sobrevivencia del PRI en el sistema electoral no depende de la alianza 
con el PVEM. Utilizando datos electorales de las elecciones legislativas 
para el período de 2006 a 2015, examinamos los distritos electorales en 
los cuales el PRI y el PVEM compiten en alianza. Encontramos que los 
objetivos individuales de cada partido, su desempeño electoral previo en 
los distritos electorales y la presencia de la alianza PRI-PVEM en las 
elecciones gubernamentales predicen la decisión de ambos partidos de 
colaborar en ciertos distritos. Nuestros hallazgos tienen implicaciones 
relevantes para entender el comportamiento de los partidos políticos en 
democracias nuevas.  
Palabras clave: México, alianzas electorales, elecciones, partidos políti-
cos 
